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Amphibious Warfare: Lessons from the 
Past for the ADF’s Future 
Peter J. Dean 
The Australian Defence Force faces a number of challenges in developing its amphibious 
warfare capability.  The acquisition of the new landing craft and the Canberra Class LHDs are 
just one small element in these developments.  Just as important will be overcoming the cultural 
barriers to the adoption of the maritime strategy laid out in the 2009 Defence White Paper.  One 
way of overcoming these issues is for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to reconnect with its 
past.  Here the ADF can find some exceptionally important lessons on training, doctrine, joint 
operations and cooperation with allies; especially in relation to Australia’s only modern maritime 
campaign, the South West Pacific Area 1942-45.1 
Culture, History and Heritage 
For a number of years now it has been widely acknowledged that the 
Australian Defence Force (ADF) is in need of an amphibious warfare 
capability.2  In 2009 this was enshrined in the Defence White Paper, 
Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030 and has been 
reinforced by the decision of the Army to allocate the 2nd battalion Royal 
Australian Regiment (2RAR) to “spearhead the push to acquire a new 
amphibious force” under the recently announced Plan Beersheba.3  Such an 
amphibious capability it is argued will able to 
deliver balanced naval, land and air forces [that] will be required for almost 
every defence contingency in the future.  This includes securing our 
offshore territories, denying bases to an enemy posing a direct threat to the 
mainland, moving large forces around Australia, deploying to overseas 
operational areas and supporting disaster and humanitarian missions.4 
Integral to this strategy has been the decision to acquire a new range of 
amphibious craft and ships, the most ambitious project being the decision to 
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purchase two Canberra Class amphibious assault ships (LHD).5  But as has 
been noted: 
Acquiring this equipment, however, is but a small part of the challenges that 
lie ahead.  To turn the new hardware into capability the ADF will need new 
concepts, new doctrine, new procedures and most importantly new and 
innovative ideas.6 
At the core of developing this amphibious capability will be the need for the 
ADF, and in particular the Army, to adapt to and accept the cultural changes 
that are needed for a maritime strategy.  
In order to achieve this outcome the ADF needs to go back and rediscover 
its historical roots in this area, most significantly in the South West Pacific 
1942-45.  This conflict was where the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) 
developed an excellent tradition from which to draw on through its 
involvement with the United States Navy (USN) in landing operations 
throughout the Pacific.  The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in New 
Guinea and throughout the South West Pacific Area, via the First Tactical Air 
Force, was heavily involved in maritime and amphibious operations.  The 
Australian Army can draw on its largest ever operations, the reconquest of 
New Guinea, (that included large scale air-landing as well as amphibious 
operations), and the operations in Borneo at Tarakan, Balikpapan and 
Brunei for its cultural heritage in amphibious warfare.  
In addition, the ADF needs to continue to absorb and integrate the lessons of 
recent operations in the Primary Operating Environment (POE).7  Even 
though the ADF needs to develop the capabilities for intensive war fighting, 
operations such as those conducted in East Timor and the Solomon Islands 
will most likely be at the forefront of future ADF deployments.  
As Bruce McLennan and Gregory Gilbert have noted, “expeditionary 
operations are no easy option for navies or armies-they are specialised and 
costly activities that, if attempted, need to be taken seriously.”8  Doctrine and 
training will be two of the key elements for the development of this capability 
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to ensure that amphibious warfare can be used effectively within the 
strategic framework in which it has been conceived.  It is from the past that 
many of the lessons for the future may be learned and the critical 
requirements of a tradition and culture of amphibious operations can be 
rediscovered.  
Culture and the Australian Way of War  
Doctrine and training need to be understood within the context of strategic 
culture.  As John Hattendorf has noted, “strategists think in the context of the 
prevailing cultural and national attitudes that surround them.”9  This is 
critically important as Australia is a maritime country without a maritime 
culture—and our defence force, in particular the Army, is the same.10  
Australia’s strategic culture and approach to war has been affected by its 
“continental rather than maritime identity”.  We are dominated “by a powerful 
sense of landscape in which the country is seen first and foremost as a 
continent and not as an island.”11  
In order to develop an effective amphibious capability, the ADF must adapt 
to and accept the cultural changes inherent in implementing a maritime 
strategy.  This is not an inconsiderable task.  In many ways then the 2009 
Defence White Paper with its emphasis on a maritime defence strategy is 
working against the prevailing culture both nationally and within large 
sections of the ADF.  As Jeffrey Grey has pointed out, Australia’s approach 
to war fighting has always been distinguished by the quality of its 
expeditionary infantry, who are usually sent overseas as part of a wider 
coalition and depend on a larger ally for logistical and other support.12  
This expeditionary nature of the Australian military’s operations means that 
in one sense the Army and the ADF has culture on its side.  The historical 
tradition from the Boer War to Vietnam, through the Gulf Wars, Iraq and 
Afghanistan has revealed an expeditionary character in the Australian 
military tradition and the vital linkage between statecraft, strategy and the 
dominance of political interest.  This expeditionary mentality should serve 
then to underpin the current maritime strategy, reinforced by the ADF’s 
ongoing involvement in East Timor and the Solomons type operations which 
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sit comfortably within the 2009 Defence White Paper’s clearly defined 
POE.13  
However, for the Australian Army this historical foundation is to an extent 
offset by its traditional role in defence policy.  During the 1920s and 1930s 
when Australia relied on an Imperial Defence Policy, via the Singapore 
Strategy, the Army’s role was restricted to defeating ‘raids’ on the 
mainland.14  The fall of Singapore exposed the fallacy of a one-dimensional 
strategy and led to the only time that the broader Australian military has 
been involved in a conflict that truly embraced a maritime strategy.  But the 
South West Pacific Area (SWPA) operations of 1942-45 are at such a 
distance that the institutional memory of these campaigns is all but lost.  
Compounding this time lag is the fact that the dominating memory in 
Australia is of a series of events that sit outside this maritime experience.  
Tobruk and Kokoda, together with later Cold War and post-Cold War 
operations, might have relied on maritime sustainment, but none required 
the Army or RAAF to operate as part of a joint maritime force.15  
With Australia continuing to rely on its great and powerful friends in the Cold 
War era the ADF never had the need to develop an amphibious 
expeditionary force like the US Marine Corps or the British Royal Marines.16  
This deficiency was compounded by a succeeding defence strategy which 
was concerned with denying the 
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Warfare Studies Centre, 2002).  
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were in fact expeditionary amphibious operations.  
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northern maritime approaches to Australia, or the ‘sea and air gap’ to an 
enemy, by emphasising the capabilities of ‘strike and interdiction’ based on 
naval and air forces.17 
The priority for the Army under this strategy was continental or land defence, 
behind the first lines of air and naval power.  This meant that anyone, 
with experience of the development of maritime littoral manoeuvre during 
the late 1990s—will understand how difficult it has been to adapt the Army’s 
mindset towards an acceptance of amphibious operations … amphibious 
warfare specialists have always been peripheral figures in the ADF and 
represent the ‘unarmed prophets’ of Australian military thought.18 
The question then, is how the ADF with its culture of land warfare based 
around expeditionary infantry, is going to adapt its culture and methods to 
operating within a maritime environment?  One of the ways it can attempt to 
overcome this culture gap is to look into its past to draw out the elements 
that will provide both a tradition and culture of amphibious warfare.  This is 
no easy step given that the “ADF as a whole place[s] little premium on 
preserving its own history.”19  Nevertheless, historical insights do have the 
ability to ‘capture’ appropriate lessons, which can then be passed on “to 
ensure that the ADF’s institutional memory is not lost, or distorted.”20  Such 
history, if used correctly, can also provide insights into a way forward for 
both developing a specialist amphibious warfare capability within the Army 
as well as spreading the doctrine, training and capability across large 
sections of the ADF. 
Options for Amphibious Warfare  
The Army Land Warfare Studies Centre publication Projecting Force: The 
Australian Army and a Maritime Strategy sets out three possibilities for the 
Army’s way forward in developing its amphibious capability:  
Option One: Configuring one battle group with enablers as the amphibious 
specialist battalion.21  
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Option Two: A brigade grouped as a combined arms task force for 
amphibious operations. 
Option Three: Annual changeovers between the Army’s ten battle groups so 
as to permit broad exposure to amphibious capability.22 
Option One gives the Army depth but little breadth.  Given the orientation of 
the ADF to a maritime strategy and the commitment to operating two 
Canberra class LHDs and other amphibious assets, the adoption of such a 
path might lead to serious questioning of the Army’s commitment to the 2009 
White Paper.  It would also place severe restrictions on the level and 
flexibility of the joint force that the ADF could project and sustain at short 
notice.23  
With the ongoing necessity for short notice operations, the concept of 
readiness is one of the key features of modern expeditionary operations.  
The need for high readiness forces means “contrary to their forebears of the 
First and Second World Wars, contemporary armed forces cannot take 
months or years to train and equip” for operations.  This means that Option 
One would be especially restrictive.  Furthermore to accept the principle that 
“globalised security [is] marked by an increased need for force readiness”24 
is to also condemn not just Option One but also the credibility of Option 
Three, which provides breadth but no depth.25 
These critical factors seemingly leave Option Two as the only viable path for 
the Army to follow.26  There are also indications to suggest that the current 
Army preference is for the Townsville based 3rd Brigade to develop this 
option for its amphibious capability.27  In many ways the 3rd Brigade with its 
                                                                                                                   
 
Projecting Force: The Australian Army and a Maritime Strategy are all still open for evaluation 
by the Army in determining how it will achieve this capability in cooperation with the RAN.  
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 Palazzo, Trentini, Hawkins and Brailey, Projecting Force: The Australian Army and a Maritime 
Strategy, pp. 50-1; see also Chief of Army’s Address to Sea Power 2010 Conference, 27 
January 2010. 
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 The creation of an expeditionary force includes the requirement to provide a broad range of 
capabilities and high readiness, something that would be exceptionally difficult to achieve with 
the allocation on only one battle group which would necessitate only one company group being 
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Technology, vol. 28, no. 6 (June 2004), p. 108. 
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experience of the US Marine Corps or, more importantly, the British Royal Marines in Iraq and 
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 Chief of Army’s Address to Sea Power 2010 Conference, 27 January 2010; Cpl. Garry J. 
Welch, 31st MEU, ‘31st MEU Shares Knowledge of Amphibious Operations with Australian 
Service Members’, 8 May 2011, <http://www.marines.mil/unit/31stmeu/Pages/ 
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three (with the relocation of 3RAR in December 2011) light infantry battalions 
and its location in Townsville near the Shoalwater Bay training area, where 
joint amphibious exercises have routinely been held with the United States 
Marine Corps (USMC), makes it a logical choice.28  However Option Two 
has the potential to create a niche capability within the ADF.  While this 
would provide both depth and a high readiness force it could very well deny 
the rest of the Army’s combat units adequate training in amphibious 
operations.  As Albert Palazzo has noted “there is a need for the ARG 
[Amphibious Ready Group] to be robust [but] the Army will have to guard 
against the rest of the force trending towards hollowness.”29  
But there is a fourth option that the Army should consider—that is one that 
makes the best use of the depth to be found in Option Two and the breadth 
that can be provided by Option Three; covering the need for both a sizable 
immediately deployable force and a breadth of amphibious capabilities 
across the Army.30  Both of these factors are critical in being able to provide 
for undertaking both multiple and sustained operations.  The addition of a 
breadth of knowledge across the Army and the ADF would move the 
operational capability beyond that which a single trained brigade would be 
able to deliver.  A way forward in this area can found by looking at how the 
Australian military had to quickly adapt to the need to develop an amphibious 
warfare capability in the SWPA in 1942.  
South West Pacific Area 1942-1945 
The operations in the SWPA are of critical importance to the current Defence 
White Paper strategy for a number of reasons.  This includes the fact that 
they were: 
• The last time that the Australian military undertook major amphibious 
operations; 
• The largest and most complicated operations ever undertaken by 
the Australian military; 
• Integral components of a highly effective maritime strategy; and  
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28
 For instance Exercise Talisman Sabre 2009 and 2011 both of which involved amphibious 
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 Albert Palazzo, ‘Towards a Marine Force’, Security Challenges, vol. 7, no. 2 (Winter 2011), 
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• Modern operations—in that they included the large scale use of air 
power.  
Just as important is their geographical relevance.  As noted in Projecting 
Force,  
The success of the Australian campaigns against the Japanese represents 
a compelling argument for the advantages of a maritime strategy, not only 
because of the allied success but also because the land for which they 
fought is the same region that received consideration in the 2009 Defence 
White Paper.31 
Another important factor is that the SWPA, as an operational theatre, was 
well behind Europe and the Central Pacific areas in terms of priorities for 
resources.  As a result all of its operations were undertaken using limited 
shipping, manpower and equipment.  This meant that the Commander in 
Chief, General Douglas MacArthur, had to adopt a manoeuvrist strategy 
based on limited naval assets and land-based air power.  The other 
significant factor in these successful operations was that the Australian 
military, despite lacking a strong tradition in amphibious operations, was able 
to bring together contemporary doctrinal thinking on the subject and work 
exceptionally effectively with our US allies.   
Training for Amphibious Warfare: The Joint Overseas 
Operational Training School 
During 1942, MacArthur’s General Headquarters South West Pacific Area 
(GHQ) as well as the Australian Commander-in-Chief, and Commander 
Allied Land Forces, General Sir Thomas Blamey’s headquarters (LHQ) set 
about the enormous task of planning for the reconquest of Rabaul.  
MacArthur, a land commander, quickly realised that the key to his mission 
was the adoption of a maritime strategy and the development of an 
amphibious warfare capability.  After discussions with Blamey the decision 
was made to establish a Joint Overseas Operational Training School 
(JOOTS).  This school was designed as a joint US-Australian, Army-Navy-
Air Force, operation and MacArthur described its mission as 
Training of Land Forces in overseas operations in conjunction and 
cooperation with Naval Forces and Air Forces, both land and carrier based 
… The task will involve the combat loading of ships, the disembarkation of 
troops and supplies in small boats in the face of an enemy, the landing on 
hostile shores, a rapid and strong thrust inland, and the occupation of 
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 Palazzo, Trentini, Hawkins and Brailey, Projecting Force: The Australian Army and Maritime 
Strategy, pp. 14-5.  For a discussion of maritime strategy in this area see also John Reeve, 
Maritime Strategy and Defence of the Archipelagic Inner Arc, Working Paper No. 5 (place: 
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hostile coast lines with continued operations into the interior, all tasks in 
coordination with Naval and Air support.32  
JOOTS was originally set up at Port Stephens on the New South Wales mid 
north coast.  This locality was also the base area for the RAN’s training 
school for boat handling in amphibious warfare, the aptly named HMAS 
Assault, under Commander F. N. Cook, RAN.33  The first students graduated 
from JOOTS on 25 September 1942.  
Initially JOOTS was heavily theoretical and designed to run courses to train 
senior officers at division, brigade and battalion level who would then return 
to their formations and units to pass on relevant information and establish 
amphibious warfare training programs.  The Deputy Chief of the General 
Staff, Major General Frank Berryman, noted to First Australian Army HQ that 
the course would  
Standardise the training of the Allied forces in Combined Operations34 and 
train selected representatives from each of the services in order that they in 
turn may form a nucleus of trained instructors for further training of their 
formations.”35  
JOOTS was also soon supported by the First Australian Army Combined 
Warfare School which was established at Toorbul Point near Brisbane.  This 
school was originally responsible for training the deployable US and 
Australian divisions, regiments/brigades and battalions in amphibious 
operations, later it was to come under the direct control of JOOTS.  In 
addition JOOTS was quickly expanded to run a range of specialist programs 
consisting of courses on communications, navigation, reconnaissance, 
logistics and shore parties, for all ranks. 
In order to achieve its mission JOOTS was provided with a demonstration 
battalion, initially provided by the 3rd battalion, 127th Infantry Regiment, 32nd 
US Infantry Division until an Australian unit, 19th battalion (Australian Military 
Forces), was specially trained to take over the role.  Due to a worldwide 
shortage of equipment the early training at JOOTS was completed with the 
bare minimum of amphibious craft and this initially restricted troops to 
training in small boats.  The desperate nature of the situation is revealed by 
the fact that this school, the major training ground for both the US and 
Australian army and navy units in MacArthur’s maritime strategy, had only 
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 Memo ‘Combined Training for Offensive Operations’, MacArthur to Blamey, 4 June 1942, 
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 Landenberger to Barbey, 26 April 1962, Barbey Papers, US Naval History and Heritage 
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six small landing boats on hand until March 1943.  Improvisation was the 
major feature up until this time with ship’s cargo nets hung over cliffs and the 
construction of simulated ramps and ships in order to undertake realistic 
training.36  
Training and Certifying Combat Units  
Despite these limitations the operations of JOOTS was expanded in 
November 1942 when it was decided to include training and certifying 
combat units in amphibious operations at Port Stephens.  The initial 
orientation course for combat units that was based on five key areas:  
1. An outline of amphibious operations concepts and doctrine  
2. Organisation  
3. Mission 
4. Planning  
5. Training and Rehearsals  
This orientation course was capped off with a joint operations exercise in 
order to practice and assess the newly taught skills.  The major instructors of 
each of these courses and their various components were a combination of 
US and Australian personnel.  During the rehearsal and exercise phase 
regimental officers from the combat units were paired with naval 
commanders down through the ranks.  After the rehearsals and training 
exercises a debriefing and critique was provided by both army and navy 
officers—a system which was deemed “very effective”.37  The completion of 
this program was not the end of the unit’s involvement with the school.  In 
addition to developing their own training programs, mainly based around 
dryshod (away from the sea) training, units were often required to attend 
JOOTS for advanced training, especially when they were preparing for or 
refitting after a major operation, returning from a tasking in a different 
operational setting, or after the unit had absorbed large numbers of 
replacements due to combat losses or the transfer of personnel.  Deputy 
Chief of the General Staff , Major-General Frank Berryman, noted that by 
1943 the Army’s policy on combined (amphibious) operations laid down that 
in order to achieve a high degree of proficiency and readiness and to “meet 
                                                 
36
 Daniel Barbey, MacArthur’s Amphibious Navy (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 
1969), p. 35. 
37
 Jamison to Barbey, December 1960, Barbey Papers, Correspondence Box 2.  
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and overcome difficulties in advance”, units needed continuous and ongoing 
training.38  
Mobile Training Units  
During 1943 it became apparent that the Port Stephens locality was causing 
a major strain on resources, as it was located too far from the majority of 
troops, who had been concentrated in far north Queensland or in the rear 
combat areas in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.  As a result JOOTS 
developed three mobile training units, two under the command of US Army 
officers and one under the command of an Australian Army officer.  These 
units, a highly integrated mix of US and Australian army and navy personnel, 
trained troops based on availability and schedule not nationality.  For 
instance, the 3rd Mobile Training Unit under Major C. L. Woodcliff (US Army) 
trained the 6th, 7th, and 9th Australian Divisions in Cairns during 1944 while 
the 1st Mobile Training Unit under Lieutenant-Colonel C. T. Barton (AIF) 
trained the 33rd, 43rd, and 40th US Infantry Divisions as well as the 112th US 
Cavalry Regiment and 6th US Ranger Battalion in New Guinea and New 
Britain in 1943-1944.39  With the front line moving steadily northwards and as 
a result of the success of the mobile training teams, the facility at Port 
Stephens was closed down in October 1943 and moved to Toorbul Port and 
from there it was moved to Milne Bay in New Guinea in February 1944 and 
to Subic Bay in the Philippines in 1945.  
Doctrine 
Despite having some limitations, JOOTS was a well organised and highly 
effective training school.  Instructors were sourced from the US and 
Australian armies and navy, the US Marine Corps and the RAAF.  The 
Australians initially relied largely on instructors who had attended the British 
Combined Training Centre at Kabrit, Egypt (including one British Army officer 
and one British Royal Marine on loan to the Australian Army).  Further 
instructors were added in February 1943 when a number of 9th Division AIF 
officers who had received instruction at this centre returned from the Middle 
East and were posted to JOOTS.40  
Doctrine was originally a mixed affair with Australians relying on British 
Combined Operations Doctrine (1942) and Combined Operations for Unit 
Commanders (1941) and their own Australian Military Forces (AMF) 
Combined Operations Pamphlet No. 1 (Provisional).  The US military did, of 
course, prefer their own approach to joint operations.  Their methods being 
based on FM 31 Landing Operations on a Hostile Shore (1941), FM 31-5 
Landing Operations on a Hostile Shore [Air Operations] (1941), USN Joint 
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Action Doctrine (1927), and USN Landing Operations (1938) doctrine.  This 
combination of British and US Navy, Army and Air Corps doctrine did caused 
some tensions.  Colonel B. Q. Jones (US Army), the original Commandant of 
JOOTS until superseded by Brigadier General Volkenburgh (US Army), 
initially found these difficulties tiresome and complained about his problems 
with Australian/British methods to MacArthur’s GHQ’s operations chief, 
Brigadier General Stephen Chamberlin.  He noted that  
We constantly have to deal with our Allies.  Their system, their methods and 
their line of thought are different from ours.  In many cases measured by our 
own standards, these methods appear most inefficient.41 
Conversely Lieutenant Colonel Walker (Royal Marines) noted that the 
Americans were too rigid theoretically and their training methods were based 
on “rather out of date theory from American Army textbooks.”42  Despite 
these problems agreed methods were reached and training was able to 
move forward rapidly.  This was particularly important as the first formation 
to undergo training in 1942 was the 41st US Infantry Division.  This unit was 
then under the command of First Australian Army, which was responsible for 
the establishment of their “combined training program” utilising the graduates 
of JOOTS at the Combined Warfare Training School at Toorbul Point.  
 At the beginning of February 1943 the commander of the newly created 7th 
Amphibious Force, Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey, was give control over all 
amphibious warfare training.43  Barbey was to become one of the most 
successful amphibious warfare commanders in history, and by the end of 
1945 he had commanded fifty-six successful amphibious operations.  One of 
his first moves was to appoint Commander ‘Red’ Jamison (USN) as the 
commanding officer of JOOTS and to add more US and Australian army and 
navy officers to the staff, mainly combat veterans with experience at 
Guadalcanal, North Africa, New Guinea and Malaya.44  
Barbey standardised equipment and doctrine based on US Navy Fleet 
Training Publication FTP 167 Landing Operations Doctrine.  This was a 
relatively smooth transition.  Barbey noted that this was a result of the fact 
that there was “little difference in the two techniques [British and American] 
and they were readily integrated into the training program”.45  The only 
problems were that “A few differences in communication procedures [that] 
cropped up and caused minor problems.”46  He was, however, insistent that 
if Australian troops were to be mounted in American vessels then “they must 
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follow the entire American technique.”47  Despite Barbey’s insistence of this 
measure, the SWPA was so low in the priority allocation for amphibious (and 
all other) resources in 1943 that the 7th Amphibious Force had to modify 
standing doctrine to account for a force based mainly around smaller, often 
improvised landing ships and landing craft with little support from APD’s 
(high speed destroyer transports) and large landing ships.  Subsequently 
Commander Jamison and his Allied staff at JOOTS were charged by Barbey 
with “developing this new and untried technique.”48  Thus JOOTS became 
not only the school for the training of both instructors and units in amphibious 
warfare but also the specialist in the development of doctrine.  These new 
approaches were formalised through the establishment of Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOP) for the 7th Amphibious Force; for instance the 
adoption on 31 August 1943 by GHQ of the SOP for Boat Teams in Small 
Boats that had been developed by JOOTS.49 
Until JOOTS was up and running and in charge of all training and doctrine 
development, Barbey had to improvise training programs.  One of the first 
was for the US 1st Marine Division that was stationed in Melbourne, 
recovering from the Guadalcanal operations.  To do so he drafted the RAN 
ship HMAS Manoora (Landing Ship Infantry-LSI) and the USS Henry T Allen 
(Amphibious Attack Ship-APA), as well as a Free French and a US destroyer 
to provide naval gunfire support.  Barbey used a USMC regiment as a 
demonstration unit and brought a large group of Allied observers of all ranks 
and formations, including the staff at JOOTS, down for a training 
demonstration and post operation analysis.  Soon afterwards he made the 
RAN LSI’s Manoora, Westralia and Kanimbla available for training 
operations at JOOTS.50  
With a new doctrine to initiate and with new ships containing highly 
inexperienced crews, Commander Jamison and his allied training staff at 
JOOTS had a daunting task.  However within two months the staff had 
expanded from approximately 400 to 2,500 US and Australian personnel and 
they had in training some 20,000 combat personnel made up of the 
Australian 7th and US 32nd Infantry Divisions.  
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Joint Training  
One of the major keys to the effectiveness of JOOTS was that it had 
developed from a largely army controlled operation to an integrated joint 
services training school.  It included RAN and USN ships and amphibious 
crews and craft and the demonstration troops under the command of Lt-Col 
Rose AIF.51  The RAAF contributed by providing meteorologists as well as a 
RAAF photography team who took pictures of the training program, 
demonstrations and exercises to produce training slides.52  In addition, 
RAAF air liaison officers including personnel and aircraft from the 5th Army 
Cooperation Squadron based at Williamstown were brought in to provide 
theoretical and practical training on the use of air power in amphibious 
operations.  The only area in which cooperation was not secured was from 
the US Army Air Corps, which argued that scare resources and other 
priorities precluded their involvement.  This situation was to lead to 
difficulties in cooperation between this service and the US and Australian 
Army and Navy planners and formations in operations throughout 1943-44. 
One of the most significant factors was the high level of cooperation not just 
between the three services, but between the United States and Australia.  
Both the 7th Amphibious Force commander, Admiral Barbey, and the CO of 
JOOTS, Commander Jamison, were particularly complimentary about 
working with their Australian counterparts, as were the Australian personnel.   
Captain J. Louis Landenbeger, USN, one of Barbey’s key staff officers who 
was also “very closely associated with the training operations at Port 
Stephens, Toorbul Bay and other places” noted that the “comradeship 
between the Australians and the 7th Amphibious Force was most cordial at 
all times” believing that “I am convinced that this period of training [JOOTS] 
was well worth while.”53  
JOOTS is a fine example of cooperation undertaken in the most stressful of 
circumstances.  All of these activities were enormously successful and 
undertaken with the minimum of equipment, during the development of a 
new doctrine with army, navy, marine corps and air force personnel from two 
systems and three countries and it was done in the spirit of (almost) total 
cooperation.  This was evident in the thorough success of the amphibious 
operations that were undertaken in the SWPA from 1943-45.  
JOOTS—Lessons for the ADF’s Future? 
A contemporary version of the JOOTS concept is something the ADF needs 
to give serious consideration to.  JOOTS had a number of critically important 
roles.  It provided training for senior officers in amphibious warfare, in 
addition to offering specialist courses to all ranks, training and certifying 
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combat units and developing doctrine.  Such an effect could be best 
achieved in the contemporary environment by using the conceptual ideals 
and lessons of JOOTS to establish a Joint Expeditionary Warfare School.  
Training and developing capability should be one of the key elements of 
such a school.  In order to achieve a broad base of knowledge in amphibious 
warfare in the Australian Army, the first priority for JOOTS in 1942 was to 
provide courses for those officers who had been tasked to be instructors and 
for brigade, battalion and company commanders and their senior staff 
officers.  In the contemporary context, a joint course would be of 
considerable value in developing a solid understanding of the requirements 
of these operations across a broad range of command and staff positions in 
the ADF.  From here a much more detailed course for the development of 
junior officers should be developed.54 
After the establishment of the senior officers’ course, JOOTS progressed 
into the development of specialist training for all ranks and services in areas 
such as logistics, communications, joint fires and boat handling as well as 
the training and certification of units.  In addition to this capstone war fighting 
capability this contemporary school should place considerable emphasis on 
humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and peacetime engagement, 
activities which will most likely form the vast majority of future operations for 
this capability.  It should also provide an intellectual home for innovation and 
the development of new SOPs, techniques and doctrine for amphibious 
operations in partnership with the United States.  
While this school would need to have the development of the amphibious 
warfare capability at its core, it should also develop the broader concept of 
expeditionary manoeuvre warfare, including ship-to-objective manoeuvre, 
sea basing, operational manoeuvre from the sea and the use of air bridges 
and air power.  This would further align the ADF with developments in this 
field being undertaken by the US and United Kingdom military and in 
particular the USMC, which is specifically configured, through its Marine Air-
Ground Task Forces (MAGTF), for such operations.  As a truly ‘joint’ School 
this would also help to break down the barriers between the single services 
and to foster the ADF’s joint philosophy of war fighting. 
In addition to JOOTS fostering a joint approach to amphibious operations, 
one of the most critical elements to its success was the relationship that it 
helped forged between the Australian and US militaries.  The USN and the 
USMC in 1942 were regarded as one of, if not the world’s leading exponents 
of amphibious and expeditionary warfare and this remains so today.  The 
importance of this capability is being reinforced by the present-day thinking 
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in the USMC and USN.  As their commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan wind 
down, the USMC is re-establishing itself as an expeditionary force as 
opposed to another land army.55  They are committed to revitalising their 
“amphibious capabilities, capacities and expertise in order to meet the 
instability and uncertainty challenges in the 21st century.”56  Thus along with 
the British Royal Marine Commandos they remain our key partners for 
accessing doctrine and contemporary thinking in expeditionary and 
amphibious warfare.  They both have long established defence strategies 
centred on expeditionary maritime operations and their insights, experience 
and knowledge will be critical to the implementation of the contemporary 
ADF amphibious capability.  
Knowledge transfer is but one element of this relationship.  The ANZUS 
alliance remains at the centre of Australian defence strategy and with the 
current debate in US politics on grand strategy, on both sides of the political 
spectrum, moving more and more towards US allies carrying a greater share 
of the burden of international security57 such relationships will be even more 
important in the future.  This is further compounded by the rising importance 
of the Asia-Pacific region in US and international affairs.  
It is also widely accepted that coalitions will be an integral part of 
expeditionary warfare into the future.58  The experience of JOOTS 
highlighted the need for a common understanding of doctrine in amphibious 
warfare, and while the 2009 White Paper calls for the ADF to be able to 
undertake independent operations,59 this does not mean that Australian 
doctrine and operational techniques should differ greatly from the United 
States.  This is especially the case given the fact that the United States is 
both the leading exponent of this type of war fighting as well as Australia’s 
most likely partner in both military and non-war like operations in the Asia–
Pacific region.  As Thierry Gongora has argued  
the fact that most international operations take place in a multination context 
creates a requirement for interoperability with other coalition partners.  Even 
the most deployable force will not be considered by a coalition if once 
deployed it cannot operate effectively with other members due to language, 
or doctrinal barriers, or incompatibility in equipment and supplies.60 
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Of note here is Admiral Barbey’s insistence in 1943 that US doctrine and 
techniques must be followed when Australian troops were in US vessels.  
This should give rise to consideration by the ADF as to what would transpire 
if such a situation was to arise in the future? With only two Canberra class 
LHD’s in service, this appears highly likely.61 
The announcement by President Barack Obama of the rotation of 2500 US 
Marines through northern Australia also raises a number of questions.  While 
the numbers of troops are small this commitment provides a platform for 
future growth and also raises the possibility of the USMC taking up the load 
for an amphibious force in the region.  This increase in USMC involvement in 
the region could conversely raise the possibility of burden sharing whereby 
Australia takes on the role of regional stability enforcement, negating the 
need for high end amphibious capabilities in the ADF.  However the 2009 
Defence White Paper’s commitment to mid level warfare fighting capability 
and independent operations in this sphere means that preparations for major 
operations are necessary under the current strategic guidance.  Either way, 
as a force designed to be able to work from stability operations through to 
high intensity conflict the ADF must be able to operate in tandem with our 
US partners and this requires a high degree of interoperability.  A 
convergence of doctrine in this area between the ADF and the US military 
would help to facilitate a successful outcome.  
As such, the ADF should actively seek officers from the US and United 
Kingdom services to be posted to this Australian school while ADF 
personnel, both officers and senior NCO’s, need to spend time overseas with 
their USN, USMC and British RM counterparts.  In addition, this cooperative 
approach should not just be restricted to our traditional partners.  The POE 
extends into considerable parts of the world to the west of Australia and the 
dedication of a brigade to amphibious operations in the Indian military 
provides an opportunity to further our ties with this important strategic 
partner.  
One of the final moves, but also one of the most critical lessons for the 
current ADF, was JOOTS’ development of its mobile training units.  The ADF 
should also make strong use this idea as it will be critical to providing broad 
ranging depth of knowledge in amphibious warfare, moving the Army beyond 
its current, and rather limiting, three option proposal.  Such joint training 
units/teams from a Joint Expeditionary Warfare School would be able to 
move around the country to provide tailored packages in theoretical 
instruction, training exercises and certifications of units, regular and reserve.   
This would help to provide for the requirement of a breadth of knowledge of 
joint amphibious and expeditionary operations across a full range of combat 
and combat support units in the Army, Navy and Air Force.  
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Commitment to the Amphibious Concept in the ADF  
The 2009 Defence White Paper details the strategic maritime approach and 
the need for an expeditionary amphibious capability.  As noted, there is a 
solid historical foundation to build upon, but there needs to be a strong 
commitment from all areas of the ADF to overcome the cultural as well as 
doctrinal and capability issues.  This is no easy task.  It cannot be achieved 
by superficial changes to equipment and doctrine.  What is required here is 
the development of a shared joint expeditionary cultural mindset.  As Major 
General Stephen Day, Head of Joint Capability and Coordination noted in 
October 2011: 
getting the best from this [amphibious capability will] require contributions 
from all three services and also from allies such as the US and Britain which 
have far more relevant experience.  Australia would need to shift its focus 
from being a frigate force to an amphibious force while the RAAF would 
need to understand their significant role in defending the air space to ensure 
safe passage of these vessels … for its part … Amphibious thinking needs 
to permeate throughout the Army.62 
These encouraging thoughts were echoed in the RAN’s thinking on this 
issue, highlighted by the 2010 Sea Power Conference which concentrated 
on Combined and Joint Operations from the Sea and “aimed at informing 
how Australia’s new expeditionary capabilities may be best introduced into 
service and used to advantage.”  
Yet while these comments are highly encouraging, it remains to be seen how 
far the ‘permeation’ of amphibious thinking will go across the ADF, 
particularly given the unique challenges that need to be faced.  One of the 
greatest limiting factors is the culture of single service orientation.63  Paul 
Hendley noted in 2005: 
each service understands its conventional business very well, but has only a 
superficial understanding of how it must adapt to become part of a cross 
environmental manoeuvre force … despite making all the right noises the 
underlying single service culture are just that, single-Service.  They see 
archipelagic manoeuvre operations and amphibious operations in particular, 
as secondary to their traditional roles.64 
Such concerns still remain.  In an article entitled ‘The Adaptive Army Post-
Afghanistan: The Australian Army’s Approach Towards Force 2030’ in a 
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recent edition of Security Challenges (Winter 2011) Major-General John 
Caligari, the Australian Army’s Head of Modernisation and Strategic 
Planning, did not even mention maritime strategy and referred to amphibious 
operations only twice—once in terms of past capability.  In the same edition 
James Brown, an ex-Army officer and Lowy Institute analyst, saw Force 
2030 as “long on maritime and aviation capabilities and short on ground 
forces.”65  This was the only time he mentioned ‘maritime’ capabilities or 
strategy in an article on ‘innovation’, indicating the often misguided 
assumption that a maritime strategy is inherently linked to the navy and not 
to all three services.  Amphibious warfare did not even rate a mention.  
Air power is the other key consideration.  One of the most relevant lessons 
of World War II in the SWPA was the profound effect that air power had on 
the nature of sea control and the prosecution of MacArthur’s maritime 
strategy.  This started with the battle of the Coral Sea, which ultimately 
turned back the Japanese amphibious invasion force bound for Port 
Moresby and led to the protracted ground campaign for Papua.  From this 
point onwards, land based air power became the key to the Allies ability to 
undertake amphibious operations in the SWPA.  The lack of cooperation 
between the Allied Air Force (mainly the US Army Air Corps) commanders 
and JOOTS caused major problems in planning amphibious operations in 
the SWPA in 1943.  The question remains of how the RAAF is going to 
adapt to the support of an amphibious warfare capability?66  The dual 
requirement for developing both an expeditionary air force as well as 
providing for the defence of the Australian mainland was one of the key 
lessons for the RAAF in the SWPA during World War II.  Yet while some key 
figures and sections of both the navy and army have made public 
commitments to support this new capability, the RAAF has remained 
relatively quiet on how it will transform to meet the operational requirements 
for amphibious warfare.67  This is exceptionally important as “a nation that 
cannot project sustained air power into a non-permissive environment 
cannot lay claim to a maritime strategy, only a sea denial strategy”68 and a 
sea denial strategy will make the survivability of any amphibious force 
ambiguous at best.  
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In the end,  
Effective amphibiosity requires appropriate shipping for sea control, air 
defence, sea transport, ship-to-shore fire support, across-the-beach 
landings, logistic resupply and medical support tasks.  It also requires 
versatile and marinised rotary-wing aircraft, well-equipped troops, flexible 
communications and logistic systems, and sound doctrine and training.69 
This is a big challenge for the ADF—bigger than what many in the single 
services currently seem to imagine.  However, the history of the Australian 
military can provide both relevant historical examples for future directions as 
well as a critically important cultural heritage platform in amphibious 
operations.  As noted by the Land Warfare Centre “The ADF’s 
implementation of a maritime strategy will be facilitated by remembering the 
lessons of the past.”70  Here the ADF can find some exceptionally important 
lessons on training, doctrine, force structures, joint operations and 
cooperation with her allies.  
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